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Abstract
Seeing another person’s face while that face and one’s own face are stroked synchronously or controlling a virtual face by 
moving one’s own induces the illusion that the other face has become a part of oneself—the enfacement effect. Here, we 
demonstrate that humans can enface even members of another species and that this enfacement promotes “feature migra-
tion” in terms of intelligence and emotional attribution from the representation of other to the representation of oneself, 
and vice versa. We presented participants with a virtual human face moving in or out of sync with their own face, and then 
morphed it into an ape face. Participants tended to perceive the ape face as their own in the sync condition, as indicated by 
body-ownership and inclusion-of-others-in-the-self ratings. More interestingly, synchrony also reduced performance in a 
fluid-intelligence task and increased the willingness to attribute emotions to apes. These observations, which fully replicated 
in another experiment, fit with the idea that self and other are represented in terms of feature codes, just like non-social 
events (as implied by the Theory of Event Coding), so that representational self–other overlap invites illusory conjunctions 
of features from one representation to the other.
Keywords Self-representation · Illusory conjunction · Sense of ownership · Attribution · Intelligence
Introduction
The ability to differentiate one’s own body from others’ is 
commonly thought to rely on continuous body representa-
tions (Gallagher 2000; Tsakiris, 2008; Lenggenhager et al., 
2007), which, however, can be updated and adjusted to the 
present situation (e.g., Graziano & Botvinick, 2002). For 
example, the rubber hand illusion (RHI) shows that people 
perceive ownership for a rubber hand lying in front of them 
if the rubber hand and their real hand are stroked synchro-
nously (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). Similarly, the virtual 
hand illusion (VHI) demonstrates that people perceive own-
ership for a virtual hand if they can operate its movements 
by moving their own hand (Slater et al., 2008). Even more 
important for our present purposes, people tend to perceive 
the face of another human as their own if it is stroked in syn-
chrony with their own face—the enfacement illusion (Tsa-
kiris, 2008; Porciello, Bufalari, Minio-Paluello, Di Pace & 
Aglioti, in press).
Research suggests that embodying the body or face of 
another person does not only tend to diminish self–other 
discrimination, but also to invite what Ma, Sellaro, Lippelt, 
and Hommel (2016) called “feature migration”. This hypo-
thetical process is derived from recent attempts to apply the 
Theory of Event Coding (TEC: Hommel, Müsseler, Ascher-
sleben & Prinz, 2001) to the representation of self and others 
(Hommel, Colzato & van den Wildenberg, 2009). The idea 
is that people represent themselves and others just like other 
perceptual events, namely, in terms of integrated networks 
of sensorimotor feature codes (event files: Hommel, 2004) 
representing all discriminable features an event or person 
consists of, such as physical attributes, affective responses, 
control states, and covert and overt actions associated with 
a given event. Importantly, given that feature codes are 
integrated and bound together, they tend to be retrieved 
as a whole when one of the features of a given event is 
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encountered. Moreover, the activation of feature codes is 
regulated by an “intentional weighting” process that gives 
more weight to attended or task-relevant features (Memelink 
& Hommel, 2013). Accordingly, focusing on common or 
discriminating features can reduce or increase the degree to 
which self and other are perceived as different, respectively 
(Colzato, de Bruijn, & Hommel, 2012). Importantly for pre-
sent purposes, to the degree that the representation of self 
and other is perceived as part of the same event, features of 
one’s representation can “migrate” to the representation of 
the other (Treisman & Gelade, 1980)—i.e., features of one 
event can become part of an “illusory conjunction” with 
the other.
Indeed, Ma et al. (2016) observed that controlling the 
movements of a virtual face by moving one’s own lead to the 
migration of mood: participants were significantly happier 
and performed better in a mood-sensitive brainstorming task 
when controlling a smiling compared to a neutral face, but 
only if virtual and actual face moved in synchrony. In terms 
of TEC, experiencing a virtual happy face as being part of 
oneself caused participants to confuse their own features 
and states with the features and states of the virtual face to 
the extent that affective features of the virtual face (i.e., the 
smile) became assimilated with participants’ self-representa-
tion. Other studies suggest that embodying another person’s 
hand, face, or body affects people’s attitudes towards the 
other or the other’s social group (for a review, see Mais-
ter, Slater, Sanchez-Vives & Tsakiris, 2015). For example, 
occupying a virtual child body facilitates combining the 
self with child-like attributes in an implicit-association test 
(Banakou, Groten, & Slater, 2013), owning a dark-skinned 
rubber hand or a black avatar reduces implicit racial bias 
of light-skinned for dark-skinned people (Maister, Sebanz, 
Knoblich, & Tsakiris, 2013; Farmer, Maister, & Tsakiris, 
2013; Peck, Seinfeld, Aglioti, & Slater, 2013; but see Estu-
dillo & Bindemann, 2016), embodying avatars of old people, 
compared to young people, reduces negative stereotyping 
of the elderly (Yee & Bailenson, 2006), and placing partici-
pants in avatars with a superhero ability promotes helping 
behavior (Rosenberg, Baughman, & Bailenson, 2013). These 
observations suggest that feature migration can change both 
attitudes and behavior, which fits with the idea that feature 
codes are sensorimotor in nature, in the sense that they are 
activated by sensory information (i.e., perception) and can 
regulate both perception and overt/covert behavior (Hommel 
et al., 2001).
So far, the impact of the embodiment of others was almost 
exclusively restricted to human bodies or body parts. Assum-
ing a permanent body representation, this makes sense: can-
didate effectors should be accepted as possible body parts 
only to the degree that they are similar to parts that this 
representation entails (Tsakiris, Carpenter, James, & Foto-
poulou, 2010). However, there is growing evidence that 
perceived body ownership may be even more flexible than 
hitherto assumed. For instance, recent studies have shown 
that people can experience ownership over avatars that are 
shaped differently from them, including not only avatars of 
different gender (Slater et al., 2010), race (Maister, Sebanz, 
Knoblich, & Tsakiris, 2013; Farmer, Maister, & Tsakiris, 
2013; Peck, Seinfeld, Aglioti, & Slater, 2013; Bufalari et al., 
2014) and age (Oh et al., 2016; Banakou, Groten, & Slater, 
2013; Hershfield et al., 2011; Yee & Bailenson, 2006), but 
also avatars with very long arms (Kilteni et al., 2012), with 
abnormally large and small bodies (van der Hoort, Guter-
stam, & Ehrsson, 2011; see also Piryankova et al., 2014), 
with tails (Steptoe, Steed & Slater, 2013), and with ampu-
tated body parts (Kilteni et al., 2016). Going a step further, 
we recently demonstrated ownership for visual objects with-
out any obvious similarity to body parts, such as balloons 
and rectangles (Ma & Hommel, 2015a).
Taken together, the aforementioned findings make it plau-
sible to expect illusions of this sort to be also demonstrated 
across species. To the best of our knowledge, only one recent 
study has addressed this issue (Ahn et al., 2016). Ahn et al. 
used immersive virtual reality to make participants viscer-
ally experience the life through the eyes of a cow or coral 
in an acidifying reef. When embodying a cow, participants 
walked in a virtual pasture on all fours, while eating feed 
and drinking water, they were goaded with a virtual cat-
tle prod and finally they were loaded onto a truck; when 
embodying a coral on a rocky reef, participants were let 
to experience coral suffering from ocean acidification by 
seeing, hearing and feeling the reef around them as well as 
their own body corrode. Results showed that participants 
embodying the cow or the piece of coral, compared to those 
who simply watched a video of these experiences, felt more 
connected with the nature and had more concerns about the 
environment.
In the present study, we were interested to see whether 
embodiment across species can be elicited also by simply 
letting participants control the movement of a virtual face of 
a member of another species. More importantly, we aimed 
to assess whether enfacing members of another species 
would induce self–other assimilation as observed for the 
embodiment of human body parts. To test that possibility, 
we designed an ape face, which is clearly discriminable from 
a human face but still keeps some degree of resemblance. 
To induce identification with this face we used a dynamic 
enfacement paradigm (see Ma et al., 2016), in which par-
ticipants could move the virtual face either synchronously 
or asynchronously.
Sforza et al. (2010) reported findings showing that ques-
tionnaire ratings for enfacement illusions tend to be low on 
average, compared to ratings obtained with the RHI and 
embodiment illusions. This suggests that the subjective 
experience of enfacement can be harder to obtain for faces 
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than for other body parts, probably because facial identity 
is at the core of the sense of the self (Tsakiris, 2008). Being 
confronted with the face of a member of another species 
is not unlikely to cause feelings of strangeness and irrita-
tion, similar to the ones reported during virtual body illu-
sions (Lenggenhager et al., 2007), which might work against 
enfacement. Therefore, to reduce the risk of incurring in 
such irritations and to maximize the virtual enfacement 
illusion, we used a morphing procedure in which a syn-
chronously- or asynchronously-moving virtual human face 
slowly morphed into an ape face. Note that we applied this 
technique to both synchrony conditions, so that possible 
effects of synchrony would be corrected for possible effects 
on the morphing procedure itself.
Building on earlier findings, we expected a synchro-
nously-moving virtual face to increase perceived owner-
ship, as measured by a standard enfacement questionnaire, 
and increase self–ape similarity. Crucially, we hypothesized 
that ownership, in turn, should facilitate feature migration 
between the representations of self and ape. Importantly, 
according to TEC logic, feature migration of this sort can 
involve all kind of features and can occur from the repre-
sentation of other to the representation of oneself, and vice 
versa.
We tested two features that we considered particularly 
diagnostic. First, we had participants to undergo the Stand-
ard Progressive Matrices (SPM) test (Raven, 1938), which 
assesses fluid intelligence. Previous studies have shown that 
people may conform to the expected attitudes and behav-
ior of the avatar they are represented by, without necessar-
ily being aware of that (i.e., the Proteus effect; e.g., Yee 
& Bailenson, 2007; Yee, Bailenson, & Ducheneaut, 2009; 
Peña, Hancock, & Merola, 2009). For instance, participants 
have been found to behave more confidentially and friendlier 
with strangers or to behave more aggressively during a nego-
tiation when controlling attractive and tall avatars, respec-
tively (Yee & Bailenson, 2007; see also Yee, Bailenson, & 
Ducheneaut, 2009). Similarly, it has been found that partici-
pants represented by avatars dressed in Ku Klux Klan outfits 
reported more negative and aggressive thoughts than those 
dressed as doctors (Peña et al., 2009). Taken together, these 
findings are consistent with previous literature showing that 
trait concepts and stereotypes become active automatically 
in the presence of relevant behavior or stereotyped-group 
features (i.e., through perception), and can cause people to 
behave consistently with the activated stereotypes (Char-
trand & Bargh, 1999). Therefore, considering the common 
stereotype that humans are more intelligent than non-human 
animals, we predicted that enfacing and, thus, in some sense 
becoming an ape should reduce intelligence and result in a 
lower score in the SPM test. Note that we relied on, but did 
not directly test this stereotype in our participants because 
the assessment would have primed the respective stereotype 
(cf., Memelink & Hommel, 2013), thus introducing a con-
found and rendering our test less diagnostic.
Second, we tested participants by means of an emo-
tion rating task assessing to which degree participants 
would attribute particular emotions to humans and apes 
(Demoulin et al., 2004). As not all emotions are assumed 
to be shared among humans and other animals, we expected 
that more emotions would be attributed to humans than to 
apes, but that this difference would be reduced or elimi-
nated after enfacing an ape. Indeed, there is evidence that 
embodiment illusions can affect people’s perception of and 
beliefs towards the embodied other, and that positive self-
like associations can be extended to the embodied others 
(Maister et al., 2015). Therefore, given that people are biased 
to maintain a positive self-image (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), 
increased self–ape similarity should cause participants to 
attribute a higher ability to experience emotions to apes. In 
contrast, attribution of emotions to humans is not expected 
to be affected by the enfacement manipulation. Note that 
possible synchronicity-induced changes in the attribution of 
emotions to apes may be restricted to emotions that are con-
sidered to be not uniquely human (i.e., primary emotions; 
Epstein, 1984), or may concern primary and secondary emo-
tions alike. Whereas the former case would indicate that par-
ticipants have judged apes from their human perspective, the 
latter case would indicate that they have judged apes from 
the perspective of an ape feeling like a human.
Methods
Participants
Given the unpredictable effect sizes, the sample was cho-
sen to double our lab standard for novel manipulations (20/
group; see Simmons, Nelson & Simonsohn, 2011). 52 vol-
unteers participated in the study for course credit or pay but 
12 of them were excluded due to technical problems—thus 
leaving 40 participants (mean age 20.88 years, SD = 2.83 
years, range 18–29 years; seven males). We used the depart-
ment’s standard advertisement system and accepted all par-
ticipants registering in the first (and only) wave. Written 
informed consent was obtained from all participants before 
the experiment. Participants were naive as to the purposes of 
the experiment. The study conformed to the ethical standards 
of the declaration of Helsinki and the protocol was approved 
by the local research ethics committee.
Experimental setup
Figure 1 shows the basic setup. The virtual faces were con-
structed and controlled by means of virtual reality environ-
ment software (Vizard and FAAST; Suma et al., 2013). We 
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used Vizard to build three three-dimensional virtual faces, 
one for each gender, based on average Caucasian faces (e.g., 
Jones et al., 2006) and one for the ape face. A computer-
ized morphing procedure was used to gradually merge the 
human and the ape faces (see Fig. 2). By integrating Kinect, 
Intersense, FAAST, and Vizard, our setup allowed partici-
pants to freely move or rotate their own face to control the 
movement or rotation of the virtual face, with a latency of 
about 40 ms—a value far below the 300-ms threshold pro-
posed by Shimada, Fukuda, and Hiraki (2009) as the critical 
time window allowing for the occurrence of multi-sensory 
integration processes constituting self-body representation.
Measures
Enfacement questionnaire
Four items were adopted from the standard RHI question-
naire (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) and enfacement studies 
(Tajadura-Jiménez, Grehl, S., & Tsakiris, 2012; Sforza 
et al., 2010). Q1 (“I felt the ape face was my own face”) 
directly addresses perceived ownership, Q2 (“It seemed 
like I was sensing the movement of my face in the location 
where the ape face on the screen was”) is a location-related 
ownership item that is sometimes aggregated with direct 
ownership to assess perceived ownership properly (Kalck-
ert & Ehrsson, 2014), Q3 (“It seemed like my own face 
began to resemble the ape face on the screen”) assesses 
perceived appearance similarity, a possible correlate of 
ownership (Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012), and Q4 (“I 
could control the ape face”) perceived agency, which 
according to Ma and Hommel (2015b) predict ownership 
in participant-active setups. For each item, participants 
chose a score on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (“strongly 
disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Note that we did not use 
the “control” questions of the RHI questionnaire, as in our 
previous studies (Ma & Hommel, 2015a, 2015b) we found 
evidence suggesting that, for illusions created using VR, 
synchrony is likely to affect responses to control questions 
as well. This is likely because dynamic manipulations, 
compared to the static ones, can make all self-perception 
aspects perceivable or salient, thereby producing measur-
able synchrony effects on all items relating to any aspect 
of self-perception that can correlate with ownership and 
agency (cf., Ma & Hommel, 2015b).
Fig. 1  The experimental setup. The participant’s facial move-
ments were monitored by means of a Kinect system (recording 
frame rate = 30  Hz) and an Intersense orientation tracker (update 
rate = 180 Hz). The Kinect system (see upper left yellow frame) was 
located behind and above the computer screen showing the virtual 
face (see lower left yellow frame). Participants sat at about 2 m from 
the Kinect system, which requires a minimum distance of 1.8  m to 
recognize human movements. Participants (here the first author) 
wore a cap with an orientation tracker attached on it (see right yel-
low frame). Computer tasks (i.e., the emotion rating and the Raven’s 
Standard Progressive Matrices tasks) were presented on a second 
screen located next to the screen showing the virtual face
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Including others in the self (IOS) scale
A variant of the IOS scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) 
assessed subjective aspects of self–other integration. The 
scale consists of seven Venn diagram-like pairs of circles 
representing varying degrees of self–other overlap (i.e., sub-
jective self–other integration). Participants are to choose the 
overlap that they think represents best the degree to which 
the virtual face looks like their own, how familiar it feels 
to them.
Raven’s standard progressive matrices (SPM)
SPMs (Raven, 1938) assessed participants’ fluid intelli-
gence. The test consists of 60 trials of increasing difficulty. 
Participants either received the even 30 trials on the first 
experimental condition and the odd 30 trials on the sec-
ond experimental condition or vice versa (counterbalanced 
across participants).
Emotion rating task
The emotion rating task was adopted from De Dreu et al. 
(2011). Participants were asked to rate, on a Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), how much 
humans and apes are able to experience 12 emotions 
(Epstein, 1984; Demoulin et al., 2004), 6 primary (affec-
tion, pleasure, attraction, fear, exhaustion, and pain) and 6 
secondary emotions (admiration, hope, surprise, embar-
rassment, contempt, humiliation). Each participant per-
formed two task blocks, one in which emotions were rated 
for Human and one in which they were rated for Ape. The 
order of the two blocks was counterbalanced across partici-
pants, and within each block emotions were presented in a 
random order.
Procedure
After having read and signed the informed consent, partici-
pants were seated in front of a computer monitor and to wear 
the cap (as shown in Fig. 1). Each participant underwent two 
synchrony (synchronous and the asynchronous) conditions 
in counterbalanced order. During both synchrony conditions, 
the participants actively operated the virtual face for 3 min 
by freely displacing or rotating their own face, which led 
to corresponding displacement or rotation movements of 
the virtual face. The 3-min interval was divided into three 
parts. During the first 30 s, participants were presented with 
either the male or the female virtual face (depending on their 
gender), which was 100% human. Then, for the next 120 s, 
the human face was morphed into the ape face (from 100% 
human–0% ape to 0% human–100% ape, in steps of 0.83% 
Fig. 2  Some representative images resulting from the morphing 
procedure applied to male (upper panel) and female (lower panel) 
faces. From left to right, 100% human and 0% ape, 75% human and 
25% ape, 50% human and 50% ape, 25% human and 75% ape, and 
0% human and 100% ape. The resulting 100% ape face was identical 
regardless of whether the male or the female face was morphed
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every second, for a total of 120 morphs, plus the two cor-
responding mapped texture pictures, each for male or female 
participants; see Fig. 2 for representative images resulting 
from the morphing procedure). For the remaining 30 s, the 
viewed face was 100% ape.
The only difference between the two conditions per-
tained to the temporal delay between people’s own move-
ments and that of the virtual face, which—excluding the 
40-ms time delay caused by the equipment—was either 
0 s (= synchronous) or 3 s (= asynchronous). Immediately 
after each synchrony condition, participants answered the 
enfacement questionnaire, responded to the IOS scale, per-
formed the emotion rating and eventually the Raven task. We 
preferred not to counterbalance the order of the Raven and 
the emotion rating tasks for the following reason. Research 
has shown that performing a demanding cognitive task is 
likely to reduce self-control (i.e., it can cause ego-depletion; 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998), and evi-
dence exists that lack of self-control can affect interpersonal 
perception (e.g., Vohs & Ciarocco, 2004; Govorun, & Payne, 
2006). Therefore, to avoid possible confounding effects 
resulting from ego-depletion we preferred to have partici-
pants perform the most demanding task (i.e., the Raven task) 
after the emotion ratings task. All participants were asked to 
take a 5-min break between the two synchrony conditions.
Results
Enfacement questionnaire
Shapiro–Wilk test revealed that the distribution of the dif-
ferences deviated significantly from the normal distribution 
for Q2, Q3 and Q4 (ps ≤ 0.04), but not for Q1 (p = 0.06). 
Because the data were not normally distributed for three out 
of four questionnaire items, the non-parametric Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test was used to compare ratings across the two 
synchrony conditions. For non-symmetrically shaped distri-
butions values resulting from the non-parametric sign test 
are reported. Analyses showed that synchrony was signifi-
cant for all items (Q1: Z = − 3.85, p < 0.001, r = 0.61; Q2: 
Z = − 4.50, p < 0.001, r = 0.71; Q3: Z = − 3.47, p < 0.001, 
r = 0.55; Q4: Z = − 4.53, p < 0.001, r = 0.72), with partici-
pants experiencing more ownership, similarity, and agency 
in the synchronous than in the asynchronous condition. 
Hence, we successfully induced a virtual enfacement illu-
sion for the ape face. Table 1 provides participants’ ratings 
(i.e., median and range in parentheses) separately for each 
item and for the aggregated ownership items (Q1–Q2) as a 
function of synchrony condition.
IOS
Shapiro–Wilk test revealed that the distribution of the dif-
ferences deviated significantly from the normal distribution 
(p = 0.002). A Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that the 
synchrony effect was significant, indicating that participants 
Table 1  Overview of 
participants’ performance for 
all dependent measures as a 
function of synchrony
Median values and range (in parentheses) are reported for the enfacement questionnaire items, IOS and 
Raven, whereas means and standard error of the mean (in parentheses) are reported for the emotion rating 
task. Significant and non-significant synchrony effects are indicated by “a” and “ns”, respectively. Columns 
2 and 3 show results for the original experiment, and columns 4 and 5 for the replication
Measure Experiment Replication
Synchrony Asynchrony Synchrony Asynchrony
Enfacement questionnaire (median and range)
 Direct ownership (Q1)a 4.0 (6) 2.0 (6) 3.0 (5) 2.0 (6)
 Location (Q2)a 5.5 (6) 3.0 (6) 5.0 (6) 2.0 (5)
 Aggregated ownership (Q1-Q2) 4.5 (6) 2.75 (6) 4.0 (5) 2.5 (5.5)
 Similarity (Q3)a 3.0 (6) 2.0 (5) 2.0 (6) 2.0 (5)
 Agency (Q4)a 6.0 (6) 4.0 (6) 6.5 (6) 4.5 (6)
IOSa (median and range) 4.5 (6) 3.0 (6) 4.0 (5) 3.0 (5)
Ravena (median and range) 25.0 (13) 26.0 (12) 25.0 (9) 26.0 (10)
Emotion rating (mean and standard error of the mean)
 Human (primary)ns 6.63 (0.07) 6.65 (0.06) 6.71 (0.07) 6.69 (0.08)
 Human (secondary)ns 6.58 (0.08) 6.63 (0.09) 6.48 (0.12) 6.55 (0.11)
 Ape (primary)a 6.07 (0.10) 5.95 (0.11) 5.71 (0.14) 5.36 (0.22)
 Ape (secondary)a 4.78 (0.19) 4.50 (0.22) 4.33 (0.19) 3.89 (0.24)
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experienced greater overlap with the virtual face after the syn-
chronous than after the asynchronous condition, Z = − 4.45, 
p < 0.001, r = 0.70, see Table 1.
SPM
Shapiro–Wilk test revealed that the distribution of the dif-
ferences deviated significantly from the normal distribution 
(p = 0.043). A sign test showed that the synchrony effect was 
significant, with a significant median decrease in Raven scores 
after the synchronous condition, compared to the asynchro-
nous one, Z = − 2.03, p = 0.043, r = 0.32, see Table 1.
Emotion ratings
Shapiro–Wilk test indicated that residuals were not normally 
distributed for the majority of factor level combinations 
(p < 0.05). However, due to the central limit theorem, the 
ANOVA can be considered robust to violations of normal-
ity (Glass, Peckham & Sanders, 1972; Harwell, Rubinstein, 
Hayes & Olds, 1992; Schmider, Ziegler, Danay, Beyer, & 
Bühner, 2010). Therefore, ratings were analyzed by means 
of a repeated-measure ANOVA with synchrony (synchro-
nous vs. asynchronous), species (human vs. ape) and emo-
tion type (primary vs. secondary) as within-participant fac-
tors. ANOVA revealed significant main effects of emotion 
type, F(1,39) = 65.39, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.63, and species, 
F(1,39) = 86.27, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.69: ratings were higher 
for primary than for secondary emotions (6.3 vs. 5.6) and, as 
expected, for humans than for apes (6.6 vs. 5.3). Moreover, a 
significant interaction involving the factor species and emo-
tion type was found, F(1,39) = 71.07, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.65. 
Consistent with previous findings (Epstein, 1984; Demoulin 
et al., 2004), Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that partici-
pants judged apes to be able to feel primary emotions to a 
greater extent than secondary emotions (6.0 vs. 4.6, p < 0.001), 
whereas no difference between primary and secondary emo-
tions was found when rating human emotions (6.6 vs. 6.6, 
p = 1). More importantly, the interaction between synchrony 
and species was also significant, F(1,39) = 6.22, p = 0.017, 
ηp2 = 0.14. Bonferroni post hoc tests confirmed that par-
ticipants attributed to apes a higher capacity to feel emo-
tions in the synchronous than in the asynchronous condition 
(p = 0.03), whereas no difference between the two synchrony 
conditions was observed when rating human emotions (p = 1; 
see Table 1). No other significant sources of variance were 
observed, Fs ≤ 2.78, ps ≥ 0.10.
Replication
While the findings came out as expected, some of the effects 
were rather small numerically and just reached the significance 
level. To make sure that our conclusions are not based on spu-
rious, non-reproducible findings, we conducted an exact repli-
cation study. 40 new participants were tested, and the statistical 
findings were exactly as in the first experiment: the synchrony 
effect was significant for all enfacement questionnaire items 
(Q1: Z = − 2.35, p = 0.02, r = 0.37; Q2: Z = − 5.13, p < 0.001, 
r = 0.81; Q3: Z = − 2.62, p = 0.01, r = 0.41; Q4: Z = − 3.85, 
p < 0.001, r = 0.61), IOS ratings, Z = − 3.40, p < 0.001, r = 0.54, 
Raven scores, Z = − 2.34, p = 0.02, r = 0.37, and a significant 
two-way interaction involving the factors synchrony and spe-
cies was found for the emotion rating task, F(1,39) = 9.46, 
p = 0.004, ηp2 = 0.20, with synchronicity affecting emotion 
ratings when judging apes but not when judging humans (see 
Table 1).
Correlations
Next, we combined the data of the two experiments to assess 
the relationship between perceived ownership and ownership-
related characteristics (self–other similarity and agency), and 
between these factors and task (emotion ratings for Ape and 
Raven) performance. The degrees of ownership (as assessed 
by the aggregation of Q1–2), agency (Q4), and self–other simi-
larity (IOS ratings) were computed by subtracting asynchro-
nous ratings from synchronous ratings. Likewise, synchrony-
induced changes in task performance were computed by 
subtracting emotion ratings for Ape and Raven scores observed 
after the asynchronous condition from those observed after 
the synchronous condition. We computed one-tailed Spearman 
correlations among changes in ownership, agency and IOS 
ratings, and synchrony-induced changes in task performance. 
Significant and positive correlations were observed between 
ownership and IOS changes, rho = 0.45, p < 0.001, ownership 
and agency changes, rho = 0.24, p = 0.017, and between agency 
and IOS changes, rho = 0.41, p < 0.001. Interestingly, emotion 
rating changes correlated positively with agency, rho = 0.40, 
p < 0.001, and IOS changes, rho = 0.29, p = 0.004, and nega-
tively with Raven changes, r = − 0.26, p = 0.010. No other sig-
nificant correlations were found, absolute rho values ≤ 0.09, 
ps ≥ 0.22.
Discussion
This study set out to test whether embodiment can be dem-
onstrated across species and whether this would induce 
self–other assimilation (and feature migration) in terms of 
intelligence and emotion attribution—as implied by our 
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application of TEC (Hommel et al., 2001). The first ques-
tion can be answered affirmatively: when the ape face moved 
in synchrony with the participants’ own face, they were 
more likely to perceive ownership for the former. It is true 
that ownership perception was not perfect, as the score fell 
into the midrange of the scale—a finding that is consistent 
with other studies of the virtual-hand (e.g., Ma & Hommel, 
2015a, 2015b) and the virtual-face illusion (Ma et al., 2016; 
Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012; Sforza et al., 2010). This limi-
tation notwithstanding, the fact that a short practice over 3 
min was sufficient to affect one’s identification with another 
species—which most participants were likely to have little 
experience with—must be considered notable. Converging 
evidence supporting the conclusion that our participants 
identified with the virtual ape comes from the IOS ratings, 
which confirm that synchrony increased the perceived over-
lap between participant and ape. Hence, humans are able 
to identify with a member of another species, probably in a 
similar way as they can embody the hand or face of another 
human. This result is not unanticipated as it fits with previ-
ous claims that people’s self-construal is dynamic and sensi-
tive to situational and cultural biases (Colzato et al., 2012; 
Kühnen & Oyserman, 2002), and that people are rather 
flexible regarding which objects and events they consider 
as being part of their body—as long as they can control 
the behavior of these objects and events (Ahn et al., 2016; 
Kilteni et al., 2016; Ma & Hommel, 2015a, b; Piryankova 
et al., 2014; Steptoe et al., 2013; Kilteni et al., 2012; van 
der Hoort et al., 2011). It is worth noting that, in the present 
study, to maximize the chance of eliciting a virtual enface-
ment illusion of an ape face, we made use of a morphing 
procedure in which a synchronously or asynchronously mov-
ing virtual human face slowly morphed into an ape face. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, such a choice was aimed at 
counteracting possible feelings of irritation and strangeness 
that could have arisen by confronting participants directly 
with the face of a member of another species. It remains to 
be established whether the morphing procedure was really 
necessary for the illusion to occur, or whether virtual enface-
ment of a member of a different species can also be obtained 
without such a procedure.
The second most important question can also be answered 
affirmatively: both the intelligence measure and the emotion 
attributions were affected by synchrony. As predicted from 
our TEC-based approach, perceiving oneself to own an ape 
face made people behave less intelligently; that is, partici-
pants tended to adopt the intellectual characteristics humans 
attribute to the species they perceived themselves to become 
a part of, thereby confirming previous findings document-
ing people’s tendency to adopt attitudes and behavior of the 
avatar they are represented by (i.e., the Proteus effect; e.g., 
Yee & Bailenson, 2007; Yee, Bailenson, & Ducheneaut, 
2009; Peña, Hancock, & Merola, 2009). We consider this a 
demonstration of feature migration in the sense of Ma et al. 
(2016): increasing the overlap of self- and other-represen-
tation invites illusionary conjunctions, in which features of 
the other become features of oneself. Moreover, enfacing an 
ape tempted participants to attribute more emotions to apes, 
another case of feature migration: when becoming more like 
an ape, participants took their emotional capabilities with 
them, so to speak. Note that synchrony affected primary and 
secondary emotions alike. While primary emotions are con-
sidered to be shared among humans and other highly evolved 
animals, secondary emotions are commonly thought to be 
uniquely human (Epstein, 1984). If our human participants 
would have judged apes from their human perspective, one 
might have expected that synchrony has a stronger impact 
on primary emotions attributed to apes than on secondary 
emotions. However, given that synchrony enhanced the attri-
bution of both kinds of emotions, it seems that the emotion 
attribution in this condition relied on a more “insider per-
spective”, that is, from the perspective of an ape feeling like 
a human. In other words, when embodying another person 
(or a member of another species), self-related attributes can 
be extended to the embodied others who become more like 
the self. This fits with the observation that synchrony had 
no effect on the attribution of emotions to humans, which 
also rules out the possibility that the enfacement experience 
facilitated emotion attribution in general.
In the present study, we were interested to see whether 
feature migration can lead to the integration of features 
of another individual into the representation of oneself. 
However, we would like to emphasize that, theoretically 
speaking, features would be expected to migrate both 
ways: from other to self and from self to other. So, while 
our present study was tapping into the route from other to 
self, some recent studies have provided evidence that fea-
tures may migrate from self to other as well. For instance, 
body-ownership illusions have been found to induce a more 
positive attitude toward social out-groups (e.g., Maister 
et al., 2015), which from our theoretical view might sug-
gest that a positive self-image can migrate to an embod-
ied other. Indeed, considering that attributing emotions to 
outgroup members represents an attitude, our findings are 
consistent with, and can be seen as an extension of previous 
outgroup studies along the lines of Maister et al. (2015). 
As already mentioned, synchronous stimulation of partici-
pants’ own hand and a rubber hand typical for a racial out-
group member increased perceived ownership for the rub-
ber hand and induced a more positive attitude toward that 
outgroup (Farmer et al., 2013). Similarly, Inzlicht, Gutsell, 
and Legault (2012) reported that negative attitudes toward 
a racial outgroup were reduced by synchronizing one’s own 
movements with those of an outgroup member. It is true 
that such a modulation of implicit racial attitudes has not 
been observed in a recent study using a static enfacement 
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paradigm (Estudillo & Bindemann, 2016). This suggests 
that embodiment illusions are not always effective in biasing 
self- and/or other-perception, especially when concerning 
body parts that are strongly tied to the self-identity, just like 
faces. However, recent comparisons between dynamic and 
static hand illusion conditions have revealed that dynamic 
conditions, as used in the present study, are much more sen-
sitive to manipulations and strongly increase the coherence 
between dependent measures (Ma & Hommel, 2015a, b). It 
is thus possible that dynamic conditions, perhaps together 
with the morphing technique we used in the present study, 
will be more successful in demonstrating modifications of 
racial attitudes.
Note that in the present study we relied on explicit meas-
ures but did not use implicit measures of ownership, a deci-
sion we made for two reasons. First, explicit and implicit 
measures of body ownership have often been demonstrated 
to dissociate (e.g., Liepelt, Dolk & Hommel, 2017; Ma & 
Hommel, 2015a, b). This implies that explicit and implicit 
measures rely on different kinds of information, and so far, 
no theoretical account for such dissociations has been sug-
gested. This renders it unclear what kind of information 
implicit measures would add and which theoretical implica-
tions the convergence or divergence with explicit measures 
would have. Second, the inclusion of implicit measures was 
unlikely to be successful in our study. Previous face-owner-
ship studies have used self–other discrimination or recogni-
tion of self–other morphed faces (e.g., Sforza et al., 2010; 
Tsakiris, 2008; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012) as an implicit 
measure. The typical outcome was the tendency of partici-
pants to under-discriminate between pictures of oneself and 
of a very similar human other in the synchrony, compared 
to the asynchrony condition. This bias is commonly very 
small (around 5%), which renders it extremely unlikely to 
get anything measurable when comparing oneself against 
the picture of an ape.
Another important consideration pertains to the fact 
we did not assess participants’ stereotypes towards apes to 
verify whether and to what degree the common stereotype 
that humans are more intelligent than nonhuman animals 
was shared by our participants. As we pointed out, explicitly 
assessing this stereotype would have been likely to introduce 
unwelcome confounds. And yet, it would be interesting to 
test whether individual differences in the degree to which 
participants consider apes as less intelligent would predict 
the sizes of these synchrony-induced changes in intelligence 
and emotional competence judgments. Future studies might 
either assess these stereotypes in separate sessions and at 
considerable temporal distance and/or assess them in a more 
indirect fashion. Moreover, it would be interesting to see 
whether interventions of the sort investigated in the present 
study would lead to longer lasting changes in individual 
stereotypes—as suggested by the observations of Farmer 
et al. (2013) and Inzlicht et al. (2012). Notwithstanding 
these interesting open questions, our findings provide fur-
ther evidence that the boundaries between perceived self and 
perceived other are rather flexible, and that representational 
self–other overlap invites illusory conjunctions of features 
from one representation to the other—including others of 
another species.
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